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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE WAGE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
By ALBERT F. STRASBURGER, JR.*
T HIS last May, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.' The holding is quite simple:
the interest given prior to bankruptcy by an assignment of future
earnings is not such a security interest as to survive a discharge
under the terms of section 67d of the Bankruptcy Act.2 But behind
this case there lies a long history of dispute as to the applicable
legal theory, and deeper still there is the age-old Ibsenist drama
of the poor debtor. Countless are the studies of this broader topic,
many of which have illuminated the particular field to be treated
herein.3 Though many of these studies have assumed a legalistic
form, their greater value has rested in their presentation of the
functional materials; their primary motif has seemed a sociologi-
cal, rather than a legal, one. This is but natural for the wage
assignment problem is factually coextensive with the question of
small loan legislation and poor man finance. However, this discus-
sion will in large part take a non-functional approach. The present
day use of wage assignments seems to have had its social genesis
in the assignments of seamen's wages for necessaries before a
voyage; later this device served to protect tradesmen in New
England textile mill towns from donating a living to irresponsible
labor; the taking of assignments then became common in the
small loan field, and today the size of the practice is greatly due
to sales drives by post-war installment houses who wished to pre
vent the lamb who had overloaded from seeking economic rel)ell-
tance. 4 These facts serve as the zero-milestone of the next few
pages: into the tripartite set-up of employer, creditor, and worker.
the wide use of the wage assignment in lending and merchandising
lines has introduced the factor of public interest. That the large
*New York City; A.B., Princeton, 1931; LL.B., Columbia University
School of Law, 1935. The writer desires to acknowledge his thanks to
Professor John Hanna of the Columbia University School of Law for hi
kind assistance in the preparation of this paper.
'(1934) 292 U. S. 234, 54 Sup. Ct. 695, 78 L. Ed. 1230.
211 U. S. C. A. 107d, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 107d.3Excellent are the reports on the bankruptcy project undertaken by the
Institute of Human Relations, Yale Law School, published in (1933) 42
Yale L. J. 473-642.4Seligman, The Economics of Installment Selling 11, 117.
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scale assigning away of the means of livelihood has detrimental
effects on a healthy social structure cannot be gainsaid; and it is
of the means of escape from this evil that I write. These means
are: first, by legislation; second, employer self-help by non-assign-
ment contracts; and third, by employee self-help through bank-
ruptcy.
A claim for wages, just as any other chose in action, was not
assignable under the old common law, though such a transfer
was enforceable in equity.' With the commercialization of the
law and the tendency to depersonalize the debtor-creditor relation-
ship, statutes have given the assignee a title sustainable in a court
of law.6 Partial assignments are popularly enforceable only in
equity on the assumption of a more than two party controversy.,
This is not universally accurate for under some practice acts the
problem is reduced to one simply of joinder of parties, and the
recovery is at law.8 However, even prior to legislative regulation,
not all wage assignments were valid. Though a public servant
could assign existing claims for services rendered prior to the
assignment,9 by far the majority opinion"0 voided the assignment
5Holdsworth, History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the
Common Law, (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 997 and Cook, Alienability of Choses
in Action, (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816. Both in Selected Readings onl
Contracts 706 et seq.
6An example of such statute, Judicature Act 1873, sec. 25:6.7Graham v. Southern Ry. Co., (1931) 173 Ga. 573, 161 S. E. 125.
sThe debtor's (i.e., employer's) non-consent to a partial assignment
constituted a valid defense in the following: Jermyn v. Moffitt, (1874) 75 Pa.
St. 399; Cincinnati, H. & D. v. Lima Ry. Supply Co., (1905) 27 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 807; Chicago, B. Q. R. R. v. Provolt, (1908) 42 Col. 103, 93 Pac. 1126:
Central Ry. v. Dover, (1907) 1 Ga. App. 240, 57 S. E. 1002. Under the
present New York practice, the partial assignee may or may not join the
holder of the remainder of the claim. Supposing joinder, if the debtor
objects, he thereby consents to a suit by the partial assignee alone; where
the partial assignee sues alone, should the debtor object, the holders of the
entire claim can be brought in easily. See Porter v. Lane Construction Co.,
(1925) 212 App. Div. 528, 209 N. Y. S. 54; New York, Civil Practice Act,
sec. 278, 192. New York, Rules, Civil Practice. 102.
9Berbeck v. Stafford, (1862) 14 Abb. Prac. (N.Y.) 285.
IODiehl v. Shehan, (1932) 258 N. Y. 624, 180 N. E. 360; Bliss v. Law-
rence, (1874) 58 N. Y. 442, 17 Am. Rep. 273. Bowery Nat'l Bank of N. Y.
v. Wilson, (1890) 122 N. Y. 478, 25 N. E. 855, 9 L. R. A. 706, overruling
People ex. rel. Grattan v. Dayton, (1876) 50 How. Prac. 143, so far as the
latter case made a distinction between unearned fees and salary and holding
such assignment of fees to be against public policy.
Many states have codified these rules, and a caution is pointed to the
more specific cases. In New York, for instance, aside from the general
Personal Prop. Law, sec. 46, Municipal Law, sec. 86a, requires, in case of
assignment by a municipal employee, that the department or board head
must approve in writing. This approval must be in the full rigor of the
instrument. Neubert v. Butler, (1933) 146 Misc. Rep. 467. 262 N. Y. S. 318.
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of future earnings from an apprehension that the public would
suffer where its servants had prematurely wasted the material
reward for their loyalty. This was the English view," and what
slight minority rule exists has never gained headway with its shib-
boleth of the inapplicability of the rule to American society and
policy." Dictum exists that the doctrine of the non-assignability
of unearned government salaries should be extended over quasi-
public corporations, 13 again since the public must rely on the alert-
ness and fidelity of the public utility employee. In the absence of
statute the assignment of future earnings by a privately employed
assignor is generally valid,' 4 even though the employment be ter-
minable at will, 1" or on a piece-work basis."G But wages to be
earned under a contract of employment not existing at the time
of assignment are generally classed as a possibility not coupled
vith an interest and thus non-assignable; likewise as to a power
of attorney to execute an assignment where the power was given
prior to the contract 'of employment." The only exception to this
rule was in those jurisdictions enforcing the assignment in equity
provided its duration and the future employment were specified,"
and now in some states from a statute prescribing the form of the
instrnment, as in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.0 This was the
IIHunter v. Gardner, (1831) 6 Wilson & Shaw (Scot.) 618; Flarty v.
Odlam, (1862) 3 Durn. & East 681; Liverpool v. Wright, (1859) John. 359,
28 L. J. Ch. 868.
-'State Bank v. Hastings, (1862) 15 Wis. 83.
':'Thompson v. Interborough Rapid Transit, (1905) 49 Misc. Rep. 102.
96 N. Y. S. 416.
4Rudijkeit v. Andrews, (1906) 74 Ohio St. 104, 77 N. E. 747; Quigley
v. Welter, (1905) 95 Minn. 383, 104 N. W. 236. Minnesota has been cited
as holding (prior to statute) that an assignment of future wages indefinite
in point of time is invalid. This is incorrect for th supposed leading case
and the only one containing a glimmer of such idea, Steinbach v. Brant,
(1900) 79 Minn. 383, 82 N. W. 651 held that an assignment ebullient with
all sorts of fraud was void as to an attaching creditor.
'
3 Welborn v. Buck, (1897) 114 Ala. 277, 21 So. 786.
IGHartley v. Tapley, (1854) 68 Mass. 565.
"7Jules Wallace & Co. v. R. A. Management, Inc., (1933) 148 Misc.
Rep. 180, 265 N. Y. S. 202. The court lays down the test of the validity of
the assignment as of the date when the power of attorney is executed, citing
Thompson v. Erie R.R. Co., (1912) 207 N. Y. 171, 100 N. E. 791; Thompson
v. Gimbel Bros., (1912) 71 Misc. Rep. 126, 128 N. Y. S. 210, aff'd 145 App.
Div. 436, 129 N. Y. S. 1025, aff'd 207 N. Y. 659, 100 N. E. 794; Cooper v.
Douglas, (1864) 44 Barb. (N.Y.) 409.
18Edwards v. Peterson, (1888) 80 Me. 367, 14 Atl. 936.
'
9 Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 154, sec. 5, p. 1936; Rhode Island,
Gen. Laws, 1923, ch. 304, sec. 6, p. 1304. Gilman v. Raymond, (1920) 235
Mass. 284, 127 N. E. 794, holding that by prescribing the form the legis-
lature. while limiting the duration of the assignment to two years, thereby
broadened its application.
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bare outline of the legal basis, a device easy of execution and
backed by a responsible employer. It was thus no wonder that it
led to a social abuse that deserved the jeremiads it has everywhere
received. Early legislation, however, was not inspired with
thoughts of public weal but was the expression of employer and
creditor class protection. The rising tide of public resentment,
welled up by the work of the Russell Sage Foundation, began its
greatest sweep but a quarter-century ago, so that today thirty-nine
states have some statutory regulation.2 1 Only thirty-one states:!
have direct wage assignment statutes, and of these only twenty
have regulations other than in connection with loans.2
3
From this point, we can but indicate the particular restrictions
imposed to effect the sociological goal. The method of complete
prohibition of assignment of unearned wages has never been
widely accepted because of legislative belief that limitations as to
time, amount and to formality of execution were a sufficient safe-
guard against the poor man's discounting his future into a helpless
peonage.2 4 Various limits have been specified as to the amount
recoverable by the assignee from any single wage payment: these
limits varying in degree and kind (either flat or percentage basis
according to each state's compromise of the desire to extend some
credit facilities to the wage-earner and the social need that he
receive a substantial enough proportion of his wage in order to
exist.2 This feature of regulation was incorporated in section 17
of the fifth draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law and through
this channel became law in about a score of states. More careful
2-Designed to cure doubt as to priority in cases of assignment nnd
service of attachment or trustee writ; cases of double assignmentc. Sec
Gallert, Hilborn and May, Small Loan Legislation 184-5.
2-1Nine states have no statutes: Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico.
Oklahoma, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota. and \Vasiiington.
22Eight out of the thirty-nine states have no statutes apart from small
loan laws: Arizona, California, Florida, North Carolina, Oregon. Utah.
Virginia, and West Virginia.23For example, Arkansas, Acts 1911, p. 15. Arkansas, Digest of Stat-
utes (Crawford & Moses), sec. 7133-34, interpreted as applicable onl," to a
lending and not to a merchandising transaction, Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Warren, (1924) 162 Ark. 199, 258 S. W. 130.
24Missouri, Rev. Stat., 1919, sec. 2171; Montana, Rev. Codes. 1921, sec.
4176, forbid the assignment of unearned wages. Georgia. Code 1926. sec.
3446-66, semble as to loans. Indiana, Acts 1899, p. 193, sec. 7059. 7059c.
Indiana, Statutes (Burns 1901), containing complete prohibition, has since
been modified.
25Colorado, Ann. Stat. (Courtrights' Mills 1930), sec. 7751-62; Rhode
Island, Gen. Laws 1923, sec. 4420-26; Massachusetts. Gen. Laws. 1932. ci.
154; Ohio, Code (Throckmorton 1929), sec. 6346.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
drafting has included minima of complete exemption,2" together
with maxima so that creditors should not be needlessly ignored. 27
Time limitations to the validity of assignments of future wages
are common. These vary from thirty days in Indiana, sixty days
in Minnesota, two years in Massachusetts, to no limit.28  The
requisite formalities of execution are even more varied. Whether
as a result of specific legislation or through adoption of the uni-
form law, - 9 the great majority of states requires the consent of
the wife or spouse to the assignment. Some states require consent
to an assignment of earned wages, 30 some of unearned wages,"'
some of any wages,3 2 while some states require it only in specific
cases-as in Minnesota, only in the case of assignment as security
for a loan of $200 or less. 3 3 This general type of regulation is
certainly praiseworthy for its recognition of the spouse's interest
in the domestic economy, but the very nature of the fact situation
in these cases is strong evidence of its inadequacy."
More or less despite the fact that protection to the worker
has been the mainspring of wage assignment legislation, a few
states require the consent of the employer for the validity of
the assignment. This provision is not included in the uniform
law, and only about ten states, among them Minnesota, retain the
requirement in some form." The protection of the employer is
",;Colorado, Ann. Stat. (Mills 1930) sec. 4181 ($5 weekly) ; New Jersey.
Comp. Stat. Supp., 1924, p. 1207 ($18) ; New York, Civil Practice Act 1920.
sec. 6841 and New York, Pers. Prop. Law, sec. 46, New York, Laws 1934.
ch. 738, Pr. S. No. 31, in effect July 1, 1934 ($12).27Kentucky, Stat. (Carroll, 1930), sec. 1697 ($75 monthly) ; Idaho.
Comp. Stat. 1919, sec. 6920 ($100) ; New Jersey, Comp. Stat. Supp., 1924.
p. 1207 ($1000) ; Louisiana, Acts 1928 No. 115 uses a 50% rule within $250
maximum and $75 minimum; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 16179 applies
a sliding scale.28Indiana, Ann. Stat. (Burns 1926), sec. 9352-63, 30 days; Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat.. sec. 4135-8, 60 days; Wisconsin Stat. 1929, sec. 241.09, two
months; Maryland, Ann. Code (Bagby 1924), art. 8, sec. 16, six months;
Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1930, sec. 4706, one year; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws
1932, ch. 154, sec. 3, two years.
2-Fifth Draft, Uniform Small Loan Law, see. 17, as proposed January
1, 1932.30Colorado, Ann. Stat. (Courtright's Mills 1930), sec. 7751-62; Mon-
tana, Rev. Codes 1921, sec. 4173-82,-if the wife resides in the state.3
'Wyoming, Rev. Stat. 1931, ch. 8, sec. 102; Arkansas Digest of Stat-
utes (Crawford & Moses 1919), sec. 7133-4; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932.
ch. 154.32Indiana, Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926), sec. 9352-63.
33Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4136-8.
3 4As to the other half's improvidence, see Statements in favor of legis-
lation to regulate the assignment of unearned wages(Massachusetts, Joint
Legis. Comm., 1903), 35, 39.35Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 4135-8; New Hampshire Public Laws
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certainly a factor entitled to legislative attention, and, due to the
hostility to non-assignment contracts between employer and em-
ployee, this statutory provision is the only easy means of self-
help available to the employer. Provisions for recording, since
intended for the creditor-assignee, are also uncommon, existing
in varied form in only about eight states."' These statutes do
not change the common law of assignments: actual notice to the
employer is still necessary to bind him. However, a few states
carry this law of notice further by the requirement that notice
must be given within a limited time if the assignment is to be
enforceable. Where this limitation exists, a three or a five (lay
interval is usually permitted.17  This provision is purely public
spirited in motive; the rationale is that money lenders in their
halcyon days were wont to oblige the employee by keeping the
transaction sub rosa if he fulfilled his bargain, and then the timid
employee would succumb even deeper,-but with forced notice the
lender's goad has supposedly been removed. 8
The direct relation of wage assignments and small loans i6
manifest in the more universal requirement that the assignor I
given memoranda of the entire transaction or a copy of the instru-
ment,-together with the complementary requirement that an as-
signment executed under power of attorney is invalid. Aside
from the fact that in early days the worker would not nor could
assert the rights that were his, remedial legislation, as developed
1926, ch. 327, sec. 3-4; Kentucky, Stat. (Carroll, 1930), sec. 4758a-l ; Dela-
ware, Laws 1927, ch. 208; Pennsylvania, Stat. (Purdon, 1931), tit. 43, ch. 8.
sec. 273; Tennessee, Code (Shannon, 1932), sec. 8562; New Jersey, Comp.
Stat. Supp. 1924, p. 1207; Wyoming, Rev. Stat. 1931, ch. 8. sec. 102 and
Massachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 154, see. 3.3 GMassachusetts, Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 154, sec. 3 and Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat., sec. 4135-8, are about typical in requiring filing with the clerk of the
town or city where the assignor resides. Substantive requirements for
validity, as the consent of spouse or employer, must also be included in the
filing.
37Three days, as in Colorado, Ann. Stat. (Mills 1930), sec. 4181; Mary-
land, Ann. Code (Bagley 1924). art. 8, sec. 16; Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat.,
Sec. 4135-8; New York, Civil Practice Act, 1920, sec. 6841 and New York.
Pers. Prop. Law, sec. 46, New York, Laws 1934, ch. 738, Pr. S. No. 31, in
effect July 1, 1934; Montana. Rev. Codes 1921, sec. 4173-82. as to earned
wages, one day; Georgia, Code 1926, sec. 3446-66, five days.
38This provision must in logic assume that the employer cares not how
many assignments get plastered on him. This is not always true; so now
the rationale is, apparently, that the threat of the assassin is no longer
effective when his victim is dead. In fact, the sole utility of the provision
would seem to rest in so far as it works a voluntary complete prohibition of
assignments. Employees working for firms with a policy of discharging
workers after one or two or three assignments will naturally not assign
wages, where such notice is a prerequisite to the instrument's validity.
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by the Russell Sage Foundation, has attempted to overcome his
handicap of ignorance and to assure that he shall have some
knowledge of his position. Minnesota and several other states
have apparently overlooked this feature, but it is so widely ac-
cepted that it may be found in almost any statute previously cited.
Other types of regulation are too varied in detail for profitable
discussion here. These include statutory prescription of the
form of the assignment,3 9 the interest rates chargeable, to whom
and to what transactions the statutes apply, and the civil and
criminal sanctions attendant upon violations and subterfuges?"
The constitutionality of these statutes has rarely been ques-
tioned, even more rarely denied, 41 and in these days is only of
historical interest. The federal Supreme Court on the ground of
police power upheld the sweeping Massachusetts statute of 1908."'
State courts have sustained statutes including absolute prohibi-
tion,43 classified differences in application, 4' requirement of em-
ployer consent, 45 of filing with employer within specified time, 4
time limitation and formality of execution, 4 and spousal consent.4 8
However far the remedial legislation has gone in many states,
it has still been far from commensurate with the evil it set out to
overcome. Few states have a broad and harmonious regulation.
Minnesota, for example, which has a reasonably adequate wage
assignment law, has, with the exception of a statute applicable
"This is not so common a feature. For examples, see Massachusetts,
Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 154, sec. 3; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1923, sec. 4420-26;
Missouri, Rev. Stat. 1919, sec. 2171; Kentucky, Stat. (Carroll 1930), sec.
1697; Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1930, sec. 4706.40 The naive "purchase of wages" in place of assignment has never been
sustained, where if admittedly an assignment it would run foul. In any
event, purchases are usually classed as loans by statute for regulatory pur-
poses. Fifth Draft. U. S. L. L., sec. 16, is typical.4 1The most famous case denying constitutionality, Massie v. Cessna.
(1909) 239 Ill. 352, 88 N. E. 152, to the Illinois Act of 1905, on the ground
it was too broad in application, was perhaps erroneously decided, see (1911)
5 Ill. L. Rev. 343, but, at any rate, has long since ceased to be a practical rub.2 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, (1911) 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74,
56 L. Ed. 175.4 3Heller v. Lutz, (1917) 254 Mo. 704, 164 S. W. 123; International
Textbook Co. v. Weislinger, (1902) 160 Ind. 349, 65 N. E. 521.
4 4Ex Parte Alabama Brokerage Co., (1922) 208 Ala. 242, 94 So. 87;
Re Home Discount Co., (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 Fed. 538; People v. Stokes.
(1917) 281 I11. 159, 118 N. E. 87.
4"West v. Jefferson Woolen Mills. (1922) 147 Tenn. 100, 245 S. W. 542.
4"Thompson v. Erie R.R. Co., (1912) 207 N. Y. 171, 100 N. E. 791.
17 McCallum v. Simplex Electrical Co., (1908) 197 Mass. 388, 83 N. E.
1108; Wight v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., (1924) 146 Md. 66, 125 Ati. 881.
aSCleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Marshall, (1914) 182 Ind. 280, 105
N. E. 570.
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to semi-philanthropic associations, 9 left the field rather wide open
for the commercial lender. Taking an instance of a more specific
inconsistency, in New York, up to recently, a personal loan com-
pany chartered under the Banking Law 0 was limited to ten per
cent. of current wages on assignments securing loans of less than
$300; the judgment creditor of the employee could by garnish-
ment get ten per cent. of current wages exceeding $12 weekly,'
but aside from these restrictions one could collect the full wages
of the assigning debtor. This disparity was ironed out by statute ' -
this year to the ten per cent. above $12 level. In many states,
though popular effort continues to cry for a more complete regu-
lation, even yet this path out of the wilderness is blotched with
the mudholes of the unmitigated laissez-faire tradition.
But even where statutory regulation is wanting, there are, as
suggested above, other confessionals by which we might be shriven
of the curse of the improvident worker. What I have designated
employer self-help through non-assignment employment contracts
is the problem of what can or might be done by a contractual
clause limiting or prohibiting assignments,-plus a much larger
concept. The first part deals with the recognition, or not, of the
employer's desire to save himself expense caused by the filing of
wage assignments against him,-determination of their validity,
of their priority, loss from an incorrect decision, besides all the
departmental incidentals such as filing, notations to the paymaster,
etc. That this is at least a dollars-and-cents consideration may be
deduced from the fact that in large corporations approximately
one employee in fifty-five assigns his wages."5 Aside from this,
though, it would be an instrument to turn employer self interest
to a desirable social result, that wages should go to the wage-
earner and not to the money changer. Even for the simple soul
who shudders at "employer paternalism," asks who is Armour to
49Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 7042-43.
5oNew York, McKinneys Cons. Laws 1933, Supp. Banking Law, sec. 356.
SINew York, Civil Practice Act, sec. 684.
52The New York case,--a bill presented by Sen. Cilano in 1932, the same
sort of bill was still lodged in the assembly judiciary committee in Spring,
1934, while at its chairman, the World-Telegram edit. March 17, 1934,
prodded. Sec. 46 of the Pers. Prop. Law went on the books May 16. Supra,
note 26.53Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago, (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 520. The
old N. Y. State Wage Assignment Comm. found thus from records of New
York Central, Consolidated Gas, Brooklyn Manhattan Transfer, Standard
Oil, etc.
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draw a circle around Willie Stevens" and clothe him in purple and
fine linen-the end is and must be all-justificatory.
The claim for wages is a money claim, a money claim arising
from contractual right. Reasoning from this, there has been
much criticism of the holding for the assignee in the State Street
Co. Case," on the theory that a contract may in terms provide for
non-assignability,-the broad argument that a contracting party
may make his covenant as he wishes." Section 151c of the Con-
tracts Restatement provides that a right may be effectively as-
signed "unless the assignment is prohibited by the contract creat-
ing the right." A like expression may be found in Williston."
After mention of the Portuguese Bank Case,"' which held invalid
a clause prohibiting assignment as applied to a money claim, Pro-
fessor Williston writes: "It can hardly be admitted, however,
that public policy forbids a contract to pay money to the promisee
and to the promisee only without the intervention of an agent, or
a contract to pay money, only if the beneficial interest in the claim
still is in the promisee." With this basis and many dicta in the
cited cases, it is generally stated that two lines of authority exist,
one supported by the Supreme Court, and the other by Professor
Williston. Nevertheless, such a statement is unfortunate because
it seems to represent neither what the law is, nor should be. "' The
should-be is self-demonstrable. A claim for money is a claim for a
thing other than a commodity; fluidity is its essence. Thus any
validation of an attempt to freeze such a claim unnaturally wipes
out the basis of commercial activity. With an eye to the fact that
the stronger contracting party will impose such a restraint, but
decline the imposition on itself, the result would tend to a steady
preemption of opportunity and a repudiation of the sadly-phrased
social doctrine of an equal chance to become unequal.
Before attempting to analyze the more pertinent cases, one
-"
1Employer and wage-earning assignor respectively in State St. Furni-
ture Co. v. Armour & Co., (1931) 345 I1. 160, 177 N. E. 702.
a Supra i. 54, discussed in Havighurst. Assignment of Wages, Effect of
Provision in Employment Contract that Wages Should Not be Assignable
without Employer's Consent, (1932) 26 Ill. L. Rev. 800.
• 
6
"Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., (1888) 127
U. S. 379, 8 Sup. Ct. 1308, 32 L. Ed. 246.
5-1 Williston, Contracts, sec. 422. page 788.
,
5 Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles, (1916) 242 U. S. 7, 37 Sup. Ct.
3. 61 L. Ed. 116.
59The apparent digression at this point seems necessary to the writerin order that the to-him-more-correct possibilities of non-assignment con-
tracts may better be comprehended.
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should 'put aside the decisions holding the prohibition of assign-
ment of money claims void on statutory grounds, and this whether
the statute is unambiguous or whether the case shows a miscon-
ception of what is in fact a real party in interest statute.-" Aside
from confining ourselves to cases of formally perfect assign-
ments," and to those decisions dealing with a contractual clause
prohibiting or limiting assignment and not those where the de-
fense is asserted that the contract was by nature non-assignable, 3
we must also eliminate cases where the prohibitory clause has been
interpreted to apply only to the service part of the contract and
not to the right of payment, 3 or where the assignee of a non-
assignable contract took with the express consent of the debtor
before the intervention of the rights of a fourth party,' or even
'where the assignor has breached a covenant that he would give
notice of any assignment, 5 for none of these would test the
validity of the debtor's attempt to keep in his own hands the
power to control the future course of his obligation.
Decisions sustaining a condition of non-transferability in the-
atre tickets may be adequately explained on the ground of license
in a service contract ;6 cases concerning the redemption of unused
railway tickets by the original purchaser's transferee, on the ground
that the railvay, not being bound to redeem for anyone, may
6°State v. Kent, (1903) 98 Mo. App. 281, 71 S. W. 1066. held valid a
city ordinance forbidding assignment of wages of city employees, and thus
was part of the employment contract and bound the relator-assignee.
Iowa, Code 1927, sec. 9452, "When by the terms of an instrument an
assignment is prohibited, an assignment thereof shall nevertheless be valid."
But see limitation, Snyder v. Bernstein Bros., (1926) 201 Iowa 931, 208
N. W. 503.
The Georgia, Code, sec. 2244, which is a general assignment section. was
taken in Bewick Lumber Co. v. Hall, (1894) 98 Ga. 539, 21 S. E. 154, to
require that a "non-transferable" credit check was still assignable. Semble
see Weber v. Rosenheim, (1890) 37 Ill. App. 72. For a lower New York
decision which rambles all over the field, Sacks v. Neptune Watch Co..(1932) 144 Misc. Rep. 70, 258 N. Y. S. 254, aff'd in an unsatisfactory opinion
in (1933) 238 App. Div. 82, 263 N. Y. S. 462.
6Lacking in State Bank v. Central Merc. Bank, (1928) 248 N. Y. 428.
163 N. E. 475; Mueller v. University, (1902) 195 I1. 236, 63 N. E. 110.
G-Devlin v. Mayor, (1875) 63 N. Y. 58.
63Butler v. San Francisco Gas & E. Co., (1914) 168 Cal. 32, 141 Pac.
818; Dixon Reo Co. v. Horton Motor Co., (1922) 49 N. D. 304, 191 N. W.
780.
64Fairbanks v. Crump Irrigation Co., (1930) 63 Cal. App. 186. 291
Pac. 629.
65Reliable Loan Co. v. Delgus, (1928) 233 App. Div. 94, 227 N. Y. S.
425.
6aCollister v. Hayman, (1905) 183 N. Y. 250. 76 N. E. 20; Purcell v.
Daly, (1886) 19 Abb. N. C. (N.Y.) 301.
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validly affix the condition against transfer.6 7  The more difficult
cases which Professor Williston cites are trading stamp cases
(like modern cigar store coupons, except that the stamps come
from a third party), and the pay check cases. The trading stamp
cases s really involve service contracts, and these, or the offers to
make such, may be made assignable or not as the contracting
parties, or the offeror wish; they are not claims for money and
thus are not holdings against the proposition that the assignability
of such a claim may not be restricted. What the stamp company
does is this: it sells the stamps to merchants subscribing to its
plan, at the same time making an irrevocable offer to redeem to any
bona fide purchasers from its subscribing members; this offer is
not made to nor is the company bound to redeem for those who
secure the stamps improperly. In short, these are offer and ac-
ceptance cases,-not assignment. The pay check cases, since
they are plainly money claim cases, call for a different and tiar-
rower differentiation, but none the less real. The pay checks or
tokens are in essence nothing more than receipts for services ren-
dered; considered in this aspect alone, the employer is probably
justified in refusing to recognize them except in the hands of the
original holder. The cases sustaining their nontransferability""
have simply neglected to see the more sensible view"° that the
transfer of the checks is itself a formal assignment of the money
claim for the wages owing, and the checks themselves are really
not the subject of a title-changing process but are only handed
over to the assignee as pieces of evidence to show the amount
due.7 ' With the exception of the rule in one jurisdiction, the
reason for which Professor Williston repudiates,72 there is no
67Salomon v. New York Central, (1914) 165 App. Div. 35, 150 N. Y. S.
202. 68Most clearly thought out case, Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis
Weber Co., (C.C. Il. 1908) 161 Fed. 219; accord, Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
v. Siegel Cooper, (1922) 225 Ill. App. 540, (1923) 309 Ill. 193, 140 N. E. 864.6 Barringer v. Bes Line Co., (1909) 23 Okla. 131, 99 Pac. 775; Tabler
& Co. v. Sheffield Coal Co., (1885) 79 Ala. 377.70Aldridge Lumber Co. v. Graves. (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 131 S. W. 846.7t Mention might be made here of another case supposed to support the
anti-Supreme Court view. Joint School Dist. v. Marathon City Bank,
(1925) 187 Wis. 416. 204 N. W. 470, where a contractor made a partial
assignment to a bank, which had not received the debtor's consent. On
refusal to pay, the bank levied on the deposit which the debtor had with it.
The debtor recovered; the bank did not take a legal title by the partial
assignment, thus had no right at law to take the debtor's deposit.
72City of Omaha v. Standard Oil Co., (1898) 55 Neb. 333, 75 N. W.
859 held for the debtor over the assignee on the theory that the debtor could
by contract relieve himself of the embarrassment of deciding conflicting
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square holding in support of his view. It would thus seem that
the Supreme Court is correct that not only is a money claim as-
signable but that no restraint may be put on its alienability; and
the chattel analogy, which that Court draws, is accurate, notwith-
standing its alleged inapplicability7 3 from the difference in point
of time when the restraint was sought to be imposed. Tile force
of the Portuguese Bank Case and of Fortunato v. Patten,' does
not seem abated by the fact that the debtor paid the money into
court. A party filing a bill of interpleader is but asking the court
to help him do the right thing, and the right thing according to
the view expressed by Professor Williston would in the former
case have given the money to the statutory lienee and in the latter
to the junior assignee, for in each the party who in fact took held
an assignment invalid for nonconsent of the debtor, and in neither
case was there an express waiver which could have been the basis
for a holding for those to whom the court finally gave the money."
We might refer here to the well-known and universal holding in
fire insurance policy cases, that a restriction on assignment after
loss is void--obviously these cases are only consistent with the
Supreme Court view. The conclusion that has been sought to be
established would thus leave the non-assignment contract sterile
as a method of escaping the wage assignment evil, and the State
Street Co. Case, as far as it went, correct.
However, the broad and venerable juridicial tradition of free-
dom of alienability should not be dispositive, for the policy of
protecting the worker has here a legitimate application. This
counter-policy, especially in its particular application of keeping
the wages where they belong, would manifestly not be a subject
for debate under a craftsman economy, and finds both its factual
and legal justification only in the last few decades. \Vith an all-
embracing industrial economy, with union regimentation, the
worker has lost his individuality, and whether or not we choose
claims, which theory Professor Williston rejects as a justification of thle
decision. Since this represents about the only substantial reason for this
view, it would seem that the statement ex cathedra of a rule of substantive
law, coupled with the denial of the necessity of showing a supporting policy.
is a departure from the raison d'etre of law.
73See (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 304.
74(1895) 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572; for a straight holding of assignee
over debtor, Bank of U. S. v. Public Bank, (1915) 88 Misc. Rep. 568, 151
N. Y. S. 26.
"5The corollary of Williston's position is that the employer-debtor could
sue the assigning wage-earner for breach of contract. But, of course, prac-
tical considerations would explain the absence of a precedent with no flukes.
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so to call it, the employer-employee relationship is one of status.
Therefore, in the field of wage assignments, the policy against
restraints has lost the reason for its existence. In final result, pro-
tection of the employee status is no different from protection of
the status of the public official, or the divorced wife, though the
reasons for restricting the alienability of their claims may have
another origin. The policy basis from which the courts would
act in upholding employer-employee non-assignment contracts
would be the whole statutory and common law panorama of small
finance and working class amelioration. While this policy of re-
straint is broad enough to cover the case where there is no prohi-
bition of assignment, the legal foundation for its exercise would
exist only when the employer and worker had so contracted. At
the same time, there should be no abuse of such a rule, for the
nature and size of wage assignment transactions, and their purpose,
would provide sufficiently precise criteria to delinit its useful
scope, and allow the policy of free alienability its proper sphere.
However, up to the present, no court -has shown any sympathy
with such an approach.71
What the debtor can by himself achieve is no solution of the
problem, but only a puerile evasion. After the evil is done, after
the wage-eaner has assigned away all he has-then, with the dun-
ning of creditors throbbing in his ears, bankruptcy will stand out
like an Elijah's chariot to the gates of salvation.7 7 After the grant-
ing of a discharge, which is only a personal release, the creditor
will, for the sake of his balance sheet, attempt to keep the assign-
ment in force, and collect wages earned after the adjudication.
7 6This argument would probably bear little weight in the Illinois court.
The State St. Co. Case reasoned thus,-that the Illinois legislation was a
demonstration of the wage-earner's right to assign, thus he could, nor could
his employer hinder him. The fallacy here is historically and logically retro-
gressive, for the course of legislation has always tended toward a goal of
further delimitation or, in some states, even refusal to recognize the right
at all.
However, should this theory prove acceptable, the problem of drafts-
manship would arise. Grismore, (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 299 discusses the
effect of a restriction when drawn (1) promise to refrain, (2) declaration
that an assignment shall be void, (3) non-assignment as an express condition
precedent to performance. The Armour contract included the first two.
The third as a practical defense in our case seems imaginative, for even tile
firms which do discharge employees for assigning wages (1o not do so inme-
diately on reception of notice; thus in many cases an estoppel would operate.
Calling this a waiver would probably conform better to the classical deti-
nition.
,7This vision may be marred by the spectre of legal fees. The Legal Aid
Society, at least in New York, does not file petitions for its clients.
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With the threat of a suit against the employer, with the consequent
possible loss of his employment, the worker's usual step is to move
for injunctive relief to prevent the creditor's interference. The
creditor's answer is that section 67 d of the Bankruptcy Act, -Liens
given or accepted in good faith... and for a present consideration
.. shall .. not be affected by this act," provides for the integrity
of the assignment despite the discharge. Usually the same remedy
is sought and the same procedure is invoked, for, the motion for
such relief being ancillary and dependent, the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court follows the original cause, and is a far preferable
alternative than a plea in bar in a state court suit, which latter is
quite inadequate due to the disproportionate trouble, cost, and
possible loss of employment involved., The Massachusetts and
Illinois state courts formerly held for the assignee, but the uniform
rule of the federal courts, with one exception, 9 and the majority
rule in the state courts supported the view that the assignmnehi
was not such a lien as to claim the protection of section 67 d. The
Supreme Court has now concluded the point in favor of this hold-
ing, and it is with the principles supporting this decision that we
are here concerned.
That one may obtain specific performance of a contract to give
security is elementary. Equally so is the legislative fiat that a con-
tract claim is provable in bankruptcy and thus dischargeable. These
factors should partly solve the problem whether the assignment
should survive discharge. Aside from the proposition that statu-
tory declarations should govern the public policy of a jurisdiction,
the worker has the strong precedent of an ethical judgment. This
fact that the pertinent cases talk so buoyantly of broad public policy
and the spirit of the statute suggests the query whether this con-
cept of policy lies deeper than the Bankruptcy Act.
Where the device of an assignment of wages to be earned in
the future under a term of service at will is used as collateral to
a debt of the assignor, the assignment is enforceable after the
service has been performed and to the extent of performance."
78Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, (1934) 292 U. S. 234, 54 Sup. Ct. 695, 78
L. Ed. 1230; Seaboard Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1931) 50 F.
(2d) 856, 18 A- B. R. (N.S.) 500.
79Matter of Bean, (D.C. Ohio, 1930) 15 A. B. R. (N.S.) 332, which
entirely overlooked its own 1905 decision of In Re Karns, (1905) 16 A.
B. R. 841.
8oPublic Finance Co. v. Rowe, (1931) 123 Ohio St. 206, 174 N. E.
738. 17 A. B. R. (N.S.) 487.
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The possible limitation is manifest that equity will not attempt
specific performance of such a contract in any positive sense,8' i.e.,
the performance of the service in order to carry out the terms of
the assignment. In practice, therefore, the assignee has a very
unsubstantial and precarious right, since it depends both on the
employer's continued kindliness and the assignor's capacity and
willingness to work. By hypothesis, the wages have no present
existence, but will come into being at some future date. Discus-
sion of this point has thus often drawn analogies from the cases
of assignments of expectancies, mortgages of future crops, and
mortgages with after-acquired property clauses, as illustrative of
the rule applicable to such property. To review, by the ancient
common law, things in action, expectancies, possibilities, and the
like were not assignable; an assignee thereof acquired no right
which was recognized by a court of law, for the act of assignment
was regarded as against policy, if not actually illegal. Equity,
however, adopted a broader rule and gave effect to assignments
of every kind of future and contingent interest in real or personal
property, when made upon a valuable consideration, for as soon
as the assigned expectancy or possibility had fallen into possession,
the assignment was enforced.12 This doctrine was supported in
the leading American case of Mitchell v. Winslow.8 3 The same
rationale has been applied to the case of assignment of future earn-
ings, and has thus provided the foundation of one argument
against the survival of the assignment after discharge: tile lien
has no prior validity, but attaches to the wages only from the
moment of existence, and thus the discharge in bankruptcy is
operative before the wages intended as security come into being. 4
The use of an analogy to the preference cases," where a mort-
s'DeRivafinolli v. Corsetti, (1833) 4 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 264.
823 Pomeroy, Eq. Juris., 4th ed. 1918, sec. 1270-1, page 3061.
"3(C.C. Me. 1843) 2 Story 630.
8
4 1n re West, (D.C. Or. 1904) 128 Fed. 205, 11 A. B. R. 782; accord,
Matter of Fellows, (D.C. Okla. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 81, 16 A. B. R. (N.S.)
355; Leitch v. Northern Pac. R. R., (1905) 95 Minn. 35, 103 N. W. 704,
14 A. B. R. 409; Matter of Potts, (D.C. Idaho 1931) 54 F. (2d) 144, 18
A. B. R. (N.S.) 436; Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, (C.C.A. 4th
Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 856, 18 A. B. R. (N.S.) 500, 502, "The assignment
in this case did not, therefore, create a lien upon the wages of the bank-
rupt at the time it was executed but such lien was to arise at the time the
wages should be earned. Until then the assignment was no more than a
contract of the bankrupt, the obligation of which was discharged by the
bankruptcy in the same way that his other personal obligations were dis-
charged."
85Thompson v. Fairbanks, (1905) 196 U. S. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 306. 49
L. Ed. 577.
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gagee is sustained in taking possession under an after-acquired
property clause within the four months period, to argue that some
present property interest must have passed at the time of the con-
tract of assignment, which, had bankruptcy not intervened, would
provide a basis for equitable relief-would misconceive that rule.
Those cases hold simply that such perfecting of his lien by the
mortgagee is not within the voidable preference section of the
Bankruptcy Act. This argument of the transfer of a present prop-
erty interest was the chief foothold of the old Massachusetts mi-
nority view: that the debt was not extinguished by the discharge,
but only the remedy on the debt was at an end; the interest of the
worker under contract for service is actual and real, as illustrated
by the fact of his ability to recover for an unjustifiable interfer-
ence with it as for an injury to any other vested property right;
money to accrue from such service is not a bare expectancy or
mere possibility but a substance capable of grasp and delivery;
his potential possession is thus subject to a transfer which will
make the assignee a lienee of a property right.60
If one prefers to be a Shylock, one could separate the interest
of the laborer in his future wages and the actual wages, and call
them both property interests capable of founding a lien. But this
rationalization seems to sacrifice the substantial before the idol
of a factual prejudice, for it both confuses a property right with
a human liberty and fails to distinguish between a rule of substan-
tive law and the adjective law. The careless use of analogies from
cases of future crops or next year's fleece breaks down at this
point, for policy considerations prevent a complete application.
Taking the case of future crops, it has been well settled ever since
the leading decision of Grantham v. Hawleys that assignments of
nonexistent property will be recognized where the subject matter
has a potential existence. Since state policy is at least implicit in
all law, and since it is too obvious to argue that better policy would
deny a man the ability by any legal machinery to deprive himself
of all rights which he may ever have in the future, it becomes
necessary to set up some standard defining the permissible from
the non-permissible. It is submitted that wherever courts can
talk of potential existence, possession of the means of production.
86Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Boston & M. R. R., (1907) 196 Mass. 528,
82 N. E. 696, 19 A. B. R. 650.
87(1615) Hob. 132, holding valid an assignment of crops to be grown
21 years thereafter.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
etc., they are willing to sustain the assignment as something in the
nature of a property interest, being a contract right to a specific
thing. In short, the concept is capable of a rough sort of reifica-
tion. On the other hand, not only does it seem difficult to reify a
laborer's right to his future wages in order to classify it as a trans-
ferable property interest, but such a process would violate one of
the most holy axioms of Anglo-American jurisprudence-that of
personal liberty.8 Following this analysis, it is apparent that when
courts scorn to enforce an assignment after discharge on the
ground that it is against the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to allow
a man to mortgage his future, the rationale has a foundation deeper
than the statute.89
The second criticism of the Massachusetts view is that it con-
fuses substantive and adjective law. The argument seems plaus-
ible that there must be a present interest in future earnings, else
how explain the case of a worker's recovery for an unjustifiable
interference with his employment,90 or injunctive relief against the
vendor of a business, who sold out with a two year non-competi-
tion agreement." The first is just another illustration of a per-
sonal right. The second is closer to our present point. It is simple
bankruptcy law that ordinarily, when a trustee in bankruptcy
adopts a contract, he takes it cum onere, and is bound to perform
as the bankrupt would have been had bankruptcy not intervened .
2
Thus in the case of a realty contract the trustee would be liable
to specific performance. But even broader cases exist where spe-
cific performance has been decreed in contract cases where the
contract could not have been so enforced against the bankrupt
had he remained solvent.93 This last factor should throw into
relief the proposition that equity is a remedial process and that
while it acts directly on a res, the ground for its exercise of l)ower
88In Re Home Discount Co., (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 Fed. 538, 17 A. B.
R. 169.
s9Matter of Voorhees, (D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 81, 15 A. B. R.
(N.S.) 666, denominating the interest given by an assignment of future
earnings at time of contract as too vague to be considered a present property
transfer capable of sustaining a lien under sec. 67 (d) of the act.
9
°Moran v. Dunphy, (1901) 177 Mass 485, 59 N. E. 125.
9
'Bradshaw v. Millikin, (1917) 173 N. C. 432, 92 S. E. 161; for the
same general principle, see Phila. Baseball Club v. Lajoic, (1902) 202 Pa.
St. 210, 51 Atl. 973, 58 L. R. A. 227.
92Sparhawk v. Herkes, (1891) 142 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 104, 35 L. Ed.
915.
93McNamara v. Home Land Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1901) 105 Fed. 915;
Parker v. Garrison, (1871) 61 I11. 250.
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is the inadequacy of the legal remedy, not any right, title, or inter-
est which the plaintiff has in the res. The same applies as to con-
tracts to give security. A more practical application of in rem
process is the stoppage in transitu where the seller having parted
with title and given credit may yet reclaim his goods." It thus
seems erroneous to infer what the substantive interest is from
the nature of the remedy afforded.
Professor Williston suggests a solution of the problem in
favor of the minority view, on the theory that the assignee of
wages has an authority or power to collect, plus an implied agree-
ment on the assignor's part not to revoke this power, and that
neither of these are such contract rights as to be provable in bank-
ruptcy and thereby dischargeable. 5 But though a chose in action
may be pledged, or be the subject matter of a power of attorney
for collection which will survive a discharge,"" no case has adopted
this argument so far as to hold valid through discharge a power
to collect choses to spring into existence at a future date. The
Illinois court, which was a minority court, had before it an instru-
ment which was patently framed on this theory, but the opinion
sheds no light on this point.9 7 It seems, though, that even an irrev-
ocable contract of agency should be provable, and thus that Pro-
fessor Williston's view implies a confusion of provability in the
bankruptcy sense with provability of damages in the bread-and-
butter sense. But be this as it may, there exist more apposite
answers.
When the creditor seeks to enforce his power of attorney after
discharge, claiming that his lien is preserved under section 67 d,
he is taking refuge in a provision not intended for him. Section
1 (23) of the Bankruptcy Act defines a secured creditor as one
who (a) holds security against the property of the bankrupt, or
(b) is secured by the individual obligation of another who holds
such security. Reading this with section 67 d, it seems the liens
there contemplated are liens directly or indirectly on some existing
property of the bankrupt. It is plain that before the institution
of bankruptcy proceedings, the holder of the power is a secured
creditor in the popular acceptation of the term, though not such a
one in the bankruptcy sense under section 57h. Now the usual
94D'Aquila v. Lambert, (1761) Arab. 399, 2 Eden 75.
951 Williston, Contracts, sec. 414, page 772.
96Stedman v. Gasset, (1846) 18 Vt. 346.
'--Mallin v. Wenham, (1904) 209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564, 13 A. B. R. 210.
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cases of creditors secured in the popular sense but not the bank-
ruptcy sense are cases where the security is the property of an-
other, or is exempt property, or is the personal indorsement of
third parties, as on a note made by the bankrupt s8 Reducing this,
it is clear that the security comes either from a third party or
from the bankrupt. With the former we are not concerned. With
the latter we are, for whatever security the holder of the power
has must have come from the bankrupt. The bankruptcy court
has jurisdiction of the bankrupt's assets,09 and the secured creditor
must there assert his lien. Even exempt property which is of such
a nature to be assignable passes into the jurisdiction of the court,"'
for the bankrupt must claim his exemption and the allowance
must be ruled on by the judge. Where a creditor has a lien on
exempt property (supposing the exemption not waived) which
would not make him a secured creditor in the sense of section 57 Ii,
he must still assert his right through the bankruptcy court. But
no case ever contended that the right of the laborer to future earn-
ings was an asset which passed to the trustee or which the bank-
ruptcy court could control, and of course the future wages them-
selves are excluded,'' and thus likewise the power of attorney to
collect those wages. Therefore, it follows that the power of attor-
ney is the only type of security emanating from the bankrupt
which does not in some fashion go through the bankruptcy court.
Taking the rule of statutory interpretation that an enumeration is
equivalent to an exclusion of what is not enumerated, and extend-
ing it so as to read that what is enumerated by necessary implica-
tion from the various sections excludes what is not, the conclusion
is that the power of attorney or agency is not such a security
interest as to take shelter under section 67d as against a plea of
discharge.
A second answer might be the following. Taking the granting
of the power of attorney for collection and splitting the contract
into two parts, one could say the first part is the granting of the
power, and the second a contract to keep the proceeds. One may
accept the first arguendo, and still reject the second. A bankrupt
9 8Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy, 2nd ed.. page 20.
99Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., (1931) 282 U. S. 734, 51 Sup.
Ct. 270, 75 L. Ed. 645.
10OLockwood v. Exchange Bank, (1903) 190 U. S. 294, 23 Sup. Ct.
751, 47 L. Ed. 1061.
'
011n Re Karns, 16 A. B. R. 841; Re Home Discount Co., (D.C. Ala.
1906) 147 Fed. 538, 17 A. B. R. 169.
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cannot by himself vacate or surrender a discharge, 0' though after
discharge he may fail to plead it, or else make a new promise. Of
course, a bankrupt could not make a binding agreement before
bankruptcy to waive his discharge afterward or not to apply for
one so that his future earnings would remain subject to collec-
tion.10 3 In effect, this is exactly what the creditor has tried to
achieve by a power of attorney or by an assignment, but this sub-
terfuge should avail him naught.
With the decision of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt by the Supreme
Court, no tribunal can now enforce the assignment after discharge,
for the bankruptcy court, having exercised its power to determine
the status of the debtor,' will be ready to grant injunctive relief
to maintain the integrity of that status.0 ' The old minority was
doubtless inspired by the belief that the device of an assignment
enabled a poor man to get credit without detriment to his creditors,
and that to deny to an honest creditor the self-protection for
which he had bargained would be a great hardship.100 The oppos-
ing side'1 7 has equally recognized that its holding would prejudice
the wage-earner in not having an interest on which he could capi-
talize. But this is not an undesirable consummation, and the credi-
tor must now assume the risk of a bankruptcy discharge, just as
he has already assumed the risk of continued employment, or com-
pliance with statutory requirements. The inapplicability of a com-
plete analogy to cases of next year's fleece or of future crops
reveals itself. It is one thing to take all of a man's property in
satisfaction of his obligations. It is quite another for his creditor
to put a rope around his neck and drag him like a marionette with-
out life or hope along the pauper's road of destiny.
1
0 21n Re Shaffer, (D.C. N.C. 1900) 104 Fed. 982.
lOlFederal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, (1925) 253 Mass. 157, 148 N. E. 379.
'
04Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, (1902) 186 U. S. 181. 22 Sup. Ct.
857, 46 L. Ed. 1113, 8 A. B. R. 1.
105Loca Loan Co. v. Hunt, (1934) 292 U. S. 234, 54 Sup. Ct. 695,
78 L. Ed. 1230; Re Home Discount Co., (D.C. Ala. 1906) 147 Fed. 538. 17
A. B. R. 169.
lO6Mallin v. Wenham, (1904) 209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564, 13 A. B. R. 210.
lO7Matter of Voorhees, (D.C. Ohio 1930) 41 F. (2d) 81. 15 A. B. R.
(N.S.) 666.
